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RECENT DECISIONS
INSURANCE (LIFE) - EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA-
TIONs.-Plaintiff sued as beneficiary under a policy issued to her son
by defendant. The provisions of the policy required proofs of claim
to be made upon blanks to be furnished by the company and to be
completed by claimant, attending physician and other persons. The
attending physician's statement, if allowed in evidence, would tend to
show (a) that insured was treated by him two months prior to the
issuance of the policy; (b) that his health had been impaired for two
years before death; (c) that he had attended insured several years
prior to the issuance of the policy for numerous causes, one of which
was a contributory cause of the death. These facts, if proven, would
tend to void the policy. At the trial, defendant attempted to introduce
this statement in evidence but it was rejected. On appeal, held, for
defendant. Rudolph v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 251
N. Y. 208, 167 N. E. 223 (1929).
Plaintiff contends that the statements contained in the certificate
of the attending physician on the blanks furnished by the defendant
constitute hearsay; that her act in supplying the certificate was in-
voluntary and, therefore, does not constitute an admission by her of
the facts therein stated; that it is privileged. A party's use of a docu-
ment made by a third person will frequently amount to an approval
of its statements as correct, and thus it may be received against him
as an admission by adoption.' A common instance of the application
of this principle is a beneficiary's presentation of proofs of loss to
the insurer. Such statements do not constitute hearsay.2 Plaintiff
knew the contents of the certificate; it was submitted as part of her
proofs of loss, and its production by her is, prima facie, admission
that the facts therein recited are true.3 It was a voluntary act, as she
personally authorized the attending physician to answer for her. 4 The
reception in evidence of the certificate for the purpose of proving an
admission of facts by the claimant would not constitute a violation of
Sections 353 and 354 of the Civil Practice Act, relative to privileged
communications. In the absence of express waiver at the trial, the
attending physician could not be allowed orally to testify to the facts
as stated in the certificate, 5 nor is the paper competent original evi-
dence. It operates, however, as an admission by claimant that the
'2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), Sec. 1073.2Buffalo, L. T. & S. D. Co. v. Knights Templar, 126 N. Y. 450, 27 N. E.
942 (1891); Hanna v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 N. Y. 526, 44 N. E.
1099 (1896); Leonard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 76 Misc. Rep.
529, 135 N. Y. Supp. 564 (1912). Cf. Goldschmidt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
132 N. Y. 486, 7 N. E. 408 (1886).
'Buffalo, L. T. & S. D. Co. v. Knights Templar, supra; Spencer v.
Citizens Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n, 142 N. Y. 505, 509, 37 N. E. 617 (1894).
'Aldridge v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 204 N. Y. 83, 97 N. E. 399 (1912).
'Redmond v. Industrial Benefit Ass'n, 150 N. Y. 167, 44 N. E. 769 (1896);
Holden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 165 N. Y. 13, 17, 38 N. E. 771 (1900) ; Meyer
v. Knights of Pythias, etc., 178 N. Y. 63, 70 N. E. 111 (1904); see also,
Clifford v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 188 N. Y. 349, 80 N. E. 1094(1907).
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facts are as stated. Its reception would violate no confidence for the
confidence had already been violated by the joint action of the physi-
cian and claimant.6 A certificate is not conclusive against the benefi-
ciary but is binding until corrected or explained. 7
E. H. L.
INSURANCE--HUSBAND AND WIFE-RIGHT OF CREDITOR OF DE-
CEDENT TO REACH INSURANCE MONEYS PAYABLE TO WIDoW.-
Decedent, at the time of his death, was insolvent and indebted to
plaintiff. In his life-time he, or defendant, his wife, had caused his
life to be insured in various insurance companies for her benefit. The
premiums for such insurance were paid annually out of the property
of the husband in an amount greatly in excess of $500 and at a time
when he was insolvent and unable to pay his debts. Plaintiff contends
that that portion of the insurance moneys which was purchased by
excess of premium above $500 should be applied in payment of the
decedent's debts. On appeal, held, for defendant. Chatham Phenix
Nat. Bank v. Crosney, 251 N. Y. 188, 167 N. E. 217 (1920).
Prior to the enactment of Section 52 of the Domestic Relations
Law 1 and at common law, married women were under the disabilities
of coverture.2 It was an open question as to whether a wife and chil-
dren had an insurable interest in the life of the husband and father.8
Insurance taken by the husband was liable for his debts and left it
impossible for those who needed assistance most to obtain it all.4
The purpose of the statute was to remedy this defect and to assure to
the widow an insurable interest in the life of her husband, and, except
when "excess" premiums were paid by him,5 neither the policies nor
the proceeds thereof form any part of his estate upon his death,
Buffalo, L. T. & S. D. Co. v. Knights Templar, supra at p. 456.
'Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32, 22 L. ed. 793 (1874);
Goldscbmidt v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra; Hanna v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
sura.
1 L. 1909, ch. 19. "A married woman may, in her own name, or in the
name of a third person, with his consent, as her trustee, cause the life of her
husband to be insured for a definite period, or for the term of his natural
life. Where a married woman survives such period or term she is entitled to
receive the insurance money, payable by the terms of the policy, as her sep-
arate property, and free from any claim of a creditor or representative of her
husband, except, that where the premium actually paid annually out of the
husband's property exceeds five hundred dollars, that portion of the insurance
money which is purchased by excess of premium above five hundred dollars,
is primarily liable for thie husband's debts."
'Whitehead v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 143, 6 N. E. 267 (1886).
8 Ruse v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 516 (1861).
'Ruppert v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Rob. (30 N. Y. Super. Ct.) 155, 156.
'Ecker v. Meyer, 118 Misc. 356, 194 N. Y. Supp. 320 (1922).
